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Question 1  
 
The main trends here pertain to the application of EU law to the UK-EU withdrawal process. 
This has only been made implicit in the relevant judicial review cases. For instance, the High 
Court in Webster by recognising the normative effect of article 50(1) Treaty on European Union 
(hereinafter TEU) and by not denying that this provision may have ‘direct effect’, impliedly 
admitted that EU law plays a role in the UK’s decision to withdraw. But beyond the question 
of whether or not article 50(1) TEU can produce direct effect (and therefore confer rights on 
individuals which UK courts are bound to enforce), the EU fundamental principles enshrined 
in article 2 TEU, such as the rule of law (as a commonly-shared principle safeguarded and 
enforced in the EU legal order) should also apply to the exit process by virtue of the UK’s EU 
membership obligations.2  
 
A UK precedent which dealt with the above issue, however, is the judgment in Shindler which 
concerns the issue of the applicability of EU legal principles to the exit process and in particular 
to the 2016 referendum and the withdrawal arrangements.3 In particular, the opinion of Lord 
Justice Elias in the Court of Appeal was unequivocal in confirming that EU law has no place 
in a state’s decision to remain or withdraw from the EU.4 Such an opinion borrows from the 
German Constitutional Court’s (Bundesverfassungsgericht or BVerfG) reserved judgment 
regarding the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. As it is well-known, the BVerfG’s Lisbon 
judgment concerned a review of the compatibility with German constitutional law of 
Germany’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. In its usual fashion,5 the BVerfG interpreted EU 
withdrawal in its own domestic terms by placing emphasis on the satisfaction of domestic 
constitutional requirements over EU ones and declaring itself to be the final arbiter of the 
constitutionality of a potential withdrawal over and above the external assessment of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (hereafter CJEU).6  
 
1 School of Law, University of Essex. 
2 See Konstadinides for protection and enforcement of EU law against the Member States: T. Konstadinides, The 
Rule of Law in the European Union, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017, Chapter 5. 
3 [2016] EWCA Civ 469 at [60] ‘…the construction of Article 50 ...which simply recognises the political reality 
that EU law can have no part to play in the decision whether a state chooses to remain in the EU.’ 
4 Re Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon [2010] 3 CMLR 13. 
5 See Brunner v European Union Treaty [1994] CMLR 57; Court of Justice EU 16 June 2015 Gauweiler and 
Others v Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400 (the OMT case); Case 2 BvR 2728/13. See for an extensive 
analysis of the OMT case the special issue German Law Journal 15(2) (2014). 
6 See Re Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon paras 329-330: [329] ‘(…) The Lisbon Treaty makes explicit for the 
first time in primary law the existing right of each member state to withdraw from the European Union (Article 
50 TEU). The right to withdraw underlines the Member State’s sovereignty (…) [330] Any Member State may 
withdraw from the European Union even against the will of the other Member States (…) There is no obligation 
for the decision to withdraw to be implemented by a withdrawal agreement between the European Union and the 
member state concerned. In the case of an agreement failing to be concluded, the withdrawal takes effect two 
years after the notification of the decision to withdraw (Article 50(3) TFEU). The right to withdraw can be 
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In a similar manner, it is worth noting the recent tendency of judges to take a rather introverted 
approach to the protection of fundamental rights vis-a-vis the European Convention of Human 
Rights (hereinafter ECHR) (described by Lord Steyn as a ‘new legal order’,7 a phrase 
reminiscent of the CJEU’s famous Van Gend En Loos and Costa proclamations about the EU 
legal order). For instance, the UK’s Supreme Court has in a number of factually different cases 
placed specific emphasis on the common law as opposed, for instance, to the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and the ECHR, as fundamental rights sources.8 
 
With reference to EU law, however, there is less resort to common law rights until Brexit. This 
is the case even during the UK’s withdrawal period. By recognising the detrimental effect of 
withdrawal on freedom of movement, Wightman appears to limit the scope of the ‘purely 
internal situation’ doctrine in the context of Brexit and confirms that ‘the’ decision to leave 
impacts on fundamental rights of EU and UK citizens.9 In this respect, the CJEU had previously 
clarified in Melloni10 and confirmed in Opinion 2/1311 that national standards of protection of 
fundamental rights must not compromise the level of protection provided for by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union or the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law. 
The Wightman decision reiterates the CJEU’s position in this regard. Even if UK law might 
allow for a reverse discrimination against its citizens on freedom of movement issues (subject 
to the Belfast Agreement and the Common Travel Area rules), this does not translate into the 
disapplication of the EU constitutional principles and the protection afforded to fundamental 
rights by EU law in the context of UK’s departure from the EU.  
 
Furthermore, one can legitimately challenge, also based on Wightman, the view that the 
definition of ‘constitutional requirements’ under article 50(1) TEU should not engage with the 
EU general principles or the rule of law requirements under article 2 TEU as have been clarified 
by the Commission and the CJEU. Equally, it can be concluded that there is no legal basis to 
argue that the EU general principles of law are inapplicable to the UK’s exit process based on 
 
exercised without further obligations because the Member State that wishes to withdraw does not need to state 
reasons for its decision. Article 50.1 Lisbon TEU merely sets out that the withdrawal of the Member State must 
take place ‘in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’. Whether these requirements have been 
complied with in the individual case can, however, only be verified by the Member State itself, not by the 
European Union or the other Member States.’ Lord Justice Elias cited this much criticised Karlsruhe Court’s 
judgment as basis for his decision in Shindler. However, historically, the BVerfG has had limited authority in 
interpreting EU law and in determining the competences of the CJEU. 
7 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56. 
8 Kennedy v The Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20; Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61  
9 See C. Gallagher QC et al, ‘An Independent Legal Opinion Commissioned by The European United Left / Nordic 
Green Left (GUE / NGL) Group of the European Parliament, 2 March 2018 available at < 
https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/independent-legal-report-brexit-and-human-rights-launched-today-
westminster > visited 31 January 2020. See also on the flaws of the draft withdrawal agreement and on the impact 
on fundamental rights: S. Smismans, ‘EU citizens’ rights post Brexit: why direct effect beyond the EU is not 
enough’ European Constitutional Law Review, Vol.14, No.3, 2018, 443 - 474. 
10 Court of Justice EU 26 February 2013, C-399/11, Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, para. 60. 
11 Court of Justice EU 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the EU to the ECHR) EU:C:2014:2454 
cited in Court of Justice EU 10 December 2018, Court of Justice EU 10 December 2018, Case C-621/18, 
Wightman, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, para [44]. 
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the General Court’s judgment in Shindler v Council12 which dealt with the request for 
annulment of Council Decision of 22 May 2017 authorising the opening of the UK-EU 
negotiations and on domestic court decisions such as Micula given in the context of state aid.13 
The former case was rejected on procedural grounds. The latter one dealt with the issue as to 
whether a UK judgment should be subject to EU rules as to state aid in the context of Romania’s 
abolition of certain tax incentives in 2005. It, therefore, carries no resonance here in the context 
of the constitutional requirements and implications of article 50 TEU for the UK.  
 
To conclude, it is argued that the decision to leave the EU should derive from the sovereign 
will of the withdrawing state.14 Such sovereign decision should be exercised within the 
boundaries of the rule of law also by reference to the principle of effectiveness of EU law and 
to the respect for fundamental rights. As such, the exercise of the sovereign right to withdraw 
from the EU pays regard to the impact of the manner of exercise of that right upon EU law in 
accordance with the common values. To argue to the contrary would be incompatible with the 
Supreme Court’s well-known judgment in Miller.  
 
Question 2  
 
UK judges seem to have long accepted that the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has been 
modified by legal developments including EU membership. Jackson and Thoburn are 
indicative of a turn in judicial approach that is keen on subjecting statutes to the scrutiny of 
constitutional review as well as elaborating on the theoretical foundations that underpin it. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court has placed in its recent judgment in UNISON emphasis on 
the rule of law as the underlying value of constitutional theory in the UK.15  
 
 
12 General Court EU 26 November 2018, Case T-458/17, Harry Shindler and others v Council of the European 
Union, ECLI:EU:T:2018:838. The action was mainly dismissed because the claimants’ plea was directed at 
quashing a Council Decision which did not produce any effect on his legal situation. As stated in para [46] the 
General Court held that ‘[a]nnulment of the contested decision would thus have no impact on the legal situation 
of UK citizens, including those who, like the applicants, live in another EU Member State and did not have the 
right to vote in the referendum of 23 June 2016 and the UK general elections. It would lead neither to annulment 
of the notification of intention to withdraw nor to suspension of the two-year time limit provided for by Article 
50(3) TEU. The applicants’ rights would remain unchanged.’  
13 See Legatt LJ in Micula and others v Romania [2018] EWCA 1081 [267]: ‘under the UK constitution Parliament 
is sovereign and that European law has domestic effect in the UK only because and to the extent that it has been 
given such effect by section 2(1) of the 1972 Act: see e.g. R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for 
Transport [2014] UKSC 3; [2014] 1 WLR 324, para 79; Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2015] UKSC 19; [2015] 1 WLR 1591, [80], [90]; R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2017] UKSC 5; [2018] A.C. 61, [41]-[42]. Second, section 2(1) of the 1972 Act refers to rights, powers etc 
‘created or arising by or under the Treaties’. It is ultimately for the UK courts to determine the scope of section 
2(1) and, in principle, a UK domestic court could decide that an EU measure or decision is so clearly outside the 
powers conferred by a Treaty provision that it would not be “created or arising by or under the Treaties” within 
the meaning of section 2(1): see Shindler v Chancellor of The Duchy of Lancaster [2016] EWCA Civ 469; [2017] 
QB 226, [58]- [59]; and the Pham case, [90]. 
14 As confirmed by the CJEU in Wightman at [56]: ‘It follows that Article 50 TEU pursues two objectives, namely, 
first, enshrining the sovereign right of a Member State to withdraw from the European Union and, secondly, 
establishing a procedure to enable such a withdrawal to take place in an orderly fashion.’ 
15 R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] 3 W.L.R. 409.  
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The CJEU has spelt out the implications of membership and (more recently) withdrawal in a 
host of decisions. With regard to UK membership, we know since Factortame that sovereignty 
meant that Acts of Parliament were no longer inviolable where they clashed with EU law. The 
CJEU has hardly changed its approach even with reference to domestic measures that aim to 
assist in the enforcement of EU law. For instance, in a recent case from Ireland, the CJEU held 
that the primacy of EU law precludes national legislation that sets up a body such as the Irish 
Workplace Relations Commission to ensure enforcement of EU law in the field of employment 
recruitment.16 The CJEU held that such a body lacked jurisdiction to decide to disapply a rule 
of national law that was contrary to EU law.  
 
Consistent with the CJEU’s jurisprudence, in a recent case the Court of Appeal invalidated the 
UK government’s decision to grant licences for the sale of military equipment to Saudi Arabia 
for possible use in the conflict in Yemen.17 The Court found that the government had violated 
article 2.2 of the EU Common Council Position 2008/944/CGSP, as adopted in the Secretary 
of State’s 2014 Guidance. Article 2.2 compels Member States to deny a licence for the sale of 
military equipment to other states if there is a clear risk that this equipment might be used ‘in 
the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law’. 
 
Such a modification of sovereignty also applies to those measures identified as constitutional 
within the UK. For instance, if EU law engages with a fundamental right from a UK 
constitutional perspective, then it is perfectly appropriate, from a UK constitutional standpoint, 
for the general principles of EU law to apply to the abrogation (such as access to justice before 
the CJEU after the exit date) or the limitation of fundamental rights18 due to Brexit. This was 
recently confirmed by Benkharbouche19 at [78], where the Supreme Court confirmed that when 
dealing with fundamental rights such as article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights20 
‘a conflict between EU law and domestic law must be resolved in favour of the former and the 
latter must be disapplied...’.  
 
Equally the degree of application of EU law to the process of UK withdrawal is key to the 
constitutionality of the decision to leave the EU and the validity of the respective notification. 
The question of application of EU law to the UK-EU withdrawal process has hardly been 
addressed by the UK courts in the relevant judicial review challenges – it only features in some 
judges’ reasoning in a rather implicit manner. By contrast, the academic debate on the scope 
 
16 Court of Justice EU 4 December 2018, Case C-378/17, Minister for Justice and Equality, Commissioner of An 
Garda Síochána v Workplace Relations Commission, (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:979. 
17 R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for International Trade [2019] EWCA Civ 1020. 
18 In this respect Lord Reed in UNISON stressed at [117] that: ‘Given the conclusion that the fees imposed by the 
Fees Order are in practice unaffordable by some people, and that they are so high as in practice to prevent even 
people who can afford them from pursuing claims for small amounts and non-monetary claims..., it follows that 
the Fees Order imposes limitations on the exercise of EU rights which are disproportionate, and that it is therefore 
unlawful under EU law.’ 
19 Benkharbouche v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs and Libya (Appellants) v Janah [2017] UKSC 62. 
20 Article 47 reads as follows: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this 
Article….’ 
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of application of EU law to the exit process (article 50(1) TEU in particular) provides a useful 
compendium in relation to the constitutionality of the decision contained in the UK’s 
notification to leave the EU, especially its subjection to EU institutional and substantive rules. 
It points to the fact that in exercising its sovereign right to withdraw from the EU the UK should 
be vigilant about the impact of the manner of exercise of that right upon EU law. This includes 
the way in which the UK adopted the decision to leave the EU and communicated such decision 
to the European Council. In the same tone, the importance of interpreting article 50(1) TEU 
and the steps taken by the withdrawing Member State in line with EU law have hardly been 
understated by academics.21 
 
Although reactions to the principle of EU law supremacy have been associated with the German 
Constitutional Court/BVerfG (see OMT preliminary reference),22 there have been efforts in 
recent years from the UK highest courts to impose limits upon the potential supremacy of EU 
law on grounds derived from domestic constitutional norms. A notable reference to 
constitutional identity by the UK Supreme Court in the HS2 case (expressed through a direct 
quote from the BVerfG) shows a tendency to revive (parliamentary) sovereignty in the context 
of identity.23 It is worth noting that article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 which precludes the 
impeaching or questioning in any court of debates or proceedings in Parliament has shaped the 
constitutional relationship between the UK and EU law, which can only be established by 
common law in the light of domestic statutes and not by the CJEU holding, for instance, that 
national courts are obliged to scrutinise parliamentary process in order to comply with EU 
secondary legislation. 
 
Outside the courtroom, the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee has used the 
term/concept of UK “constitutional identity” explicitly, but it has been very mindful of a key 
characteristic, Parliamentary Sovereignty. The closest it has come to making any reference to 
the concept of “constitutional identity”, albeit indirectly, is in the relevant Report on the HOC 
system of scrutinising EU law.24 In paragraphs 164-178, the Committee recognised evidence 
given by Chalmers, which drew on the importance of the constitutional identities of Member 
 
21 See P. Eeckhout and E. Frantziou, ‘Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A constitutionalist reading’, CMLR Vol.54, 
No.3, 2017, pp.695-734; A.F. Tatham, ‘Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!: EU Accession and 
Withdrawal after Lisbon’, in A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (Ed.), EU law after Lisbon, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, p.149; D. Kostakopoulou, ‘Brexit, voice and loyalty: Reflections on Article 50 TEU’, 
ELR, Vol.41, No.4, 2016, pp. 487-489, at p.488. Kostakopoulou argues that ‘In contemplating withdrawal and 
referenda, the Member States cannot appease themselves that they engage in actio in distans. Their actions as well 
as official discourses in national arenas affect their partners, the citizens and residents of the Union here, now and 
in the future. If they do not follow the voice or exit provisions contained in the Treaties, their actions essentially 
undermine the integrity of the EU’s institutional framework and can easily lead to a decline in trust and confidence 
in the EU...’ and ‘Giving a dissenting Member State the licence to ignore the voice and exit mechanisms existing 
in the Treaties would also be tantamount to authorising the EU’s involvement with domestic political games and 
intra-party interests and agendas, but the EU can only be guided by the “collective good”’. 
22 Court of Justice EU 16 June 2015, Case C‑62/14 Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. 
23 R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v Secretary of State for Transport and another [2014 
UKSC 3. 
24 See ‘European Scrutiny Committee - Twenty-Fourth Report Reforming the European Scrutiny System in the 
House of Commons’ 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/109/10908.htm#a31> visited 31 
January 2020. 
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States, in making two of its recommendations. The first related to a unilateral national veto of 




The main trends regarding mutual recognition and mutual trust pertain to EU criminal law 
which is built on these premises.25 As has been discussed elsewhere, mutual recognition 
constitutes the least contentious method for integration but one which nonetheless covers a 
wide range of judicial decisions in all stages of the criminal justice process. The European 
Arrest Warrant Framework Decision 2002/584 (hereinafter EAW Framework Decision) was 
the first instrument in EU criminal law to be adopted following the principle of mutual 
recognition (as opposed to harmonisation).26 Simultaneously, it is an instrument which 
although augments judicial cooperation it touches upon a number of fundamental rights – vis-
à-vis the rights of the accused subject to criminal proceedings and surrender within this 
framework.  
 
Two cases are worth discussing here: the first is the case of Minister for Justice and Equality v 
LM (hereinafter LM), a preliminary ruling which concerns the balancing of mutual recognition 
with the commitment of the EU to protect judicial independence and the fundamental right to 
effective judicial review in the context of non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant 
(hereinafter EAW). The question referred to the CJEU was whether an Irish judge shall refrain 
from surrendering a criminal suspect detained in Ireland under a EAW issued against him by 
Poland when the latter State is undermining the principle of judicial independence upon which 
the rule of law depends. The second case concerns the RO decision of the CJEU which took 
place in the backdrop of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The CJEU was requested by an 
Irish court to give a preliminary ruling concerning the implications, in view of Brexit, on the 
execution of a EAW issued by the UK under the EAW Framework Decision. The issue here 
concerned the status of mutual recognition where the execution of a EAW is pending 
clarification of the law that will be applicable in the issuing Member State after its withdrawal 
from the EU. 27 
 
Before making reference to the contribution of LM, it is important to mention that the CJEU 
has historically interpreted mutual recognition narrowly, restricting the avenues available for 
national courts to refuse to execute a EAW. Instead, it has given priority to the effectiveness of 
 
25 See on mutual recognition in EU criminal law: L. Klimek, Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in 
European Criminal Law, Switzerland, Springer Verlag, 2017; W. van Ballegooij, The Nature of Mutual 
Recognition in European Law: Re-examining the notion from an individual rights perspective with a view to its 
further development in the Criminal Justice Area, Intersentia, 2015; C. Janssens, The Principle of Mutual 
Recognition in the EU, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013; K. Lenaerts, ‘The principle of Mutual Recognition 
in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, University of Oxford, 30 January 2015. available at: 
<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/the_principle_of_mutual_recognition_in_the_area_of_freedom_jud
ge_lenaerts.pdf. > visited 31 January 2020. 
26 See M. Fichera, The Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the European Union: Law, policy and 
practice, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2011.  
27 Court of Justice EU 19 September 2018, Case C-327/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v RO, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:733. 
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mutual recognition based on presumed mutual trust. The LM judgment is therefore important 
because, although the legality of the mutual recognition system established by the EAW 
Framework Decision remains undisputed (as is its compatibility with fundamental rights), the 
judgment sees the CJEU setting the boundaries pertaining to the extent to which the EU can 
sustain an automatic system of recognition based solely on presumed trust. The CJEU’s 
reference to the principles of mutual recognition and trust in LM serves to highlight this 
fundamental premise based on Member States’ sharing of a set of common values on which 
the EU is founded (article 2 TEU). In this context, the CJEU explains that national 
implementation of EU law in a Member State is based on the presumption that all other Member 
States comply with EU law (fundamental rights in particular). It implicitly recognises, 
however, that such a presumption is difficult to sustain, especially in relation to maintaining a 
high level of mutual trust between the different actors which partake in the system.28 
 
In RO the CJEU held that the UK's decision to leave the EU did not affect the execution of a 
EAW issued by it as long as the UK was a Member State, unless there was concrete evidence 
that the person surrendered would be at risk of being deprived of his recognised rights after the 
issuing State's withdrawal from the EU.  
 
Question 4  
Speaking in 2017 Lady Hale, President of the UK Supreme Court said that constitutionally, the 
characteristics of the judiciary in a democratic state consist of four main virtues: independence, 
incorruptability; high quality and diversity. She mentioned that ‘in a recent survey of thousands 
of judges from 26 European countries, in six countries the judges’ perception of their own 
independence scored more than nine out of ten: the United Kingdom was one of those countries, 
along with Ireland, Denmark (at the top in this as in every other respect surveyed), Finland, 
Norway and the Netherlands.’29 
Judicial independence is a critical component of the concept of the rule of law and has taken a 
prominent role in the CJEU’s recent caselaw. While one may speak of a trend in the CJEU’s 
reasoning regarding judicial independence, it needs to be stressed that the CJEU’s findings lie 
in different premises. For instance, the preliminary reference in LM was framed differently to 
Associação Sindical30 which was a special case altogether dealing with the remuneration of 
judges in Portugal and its connection with judicial independence. While in Associação Sindical 
the CJEU established that judicial independence derives from articles 2, 4(3) and 19 TEU, in 
LM the CJEU focused primarily on article 47 of the  Charter as the source of judicial 
 
28 Cases where LM was applied: Poland v Maciejec, 2019 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 123; Regional Court in Bielsko-Biala, 
Poland v Charyszyn, [2019] 5 WLUK 195. 
29 Lady Hale ‘Judges, Power and Accountability Constitutional Implications of Judicial Selection’ 
Constitutional Law Summer School, Belfast <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170811.pdf> visited 
31 January 2020. 
30 Court of Justice EU 27 February 2018, Case C-64/16, Associacao Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses v Tribunal 
de Contas, (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:117. 
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independence. The CJEU, therefore, connected judicial independence with effective judicial 
review and the right to an effective remedy before a court. 
Judicial independence has been traditionally protected in the UK by means of a constitutional 
convention rather than by statute. Having said that, there are a number of written references to 
judicial exclusion from politics in various old and new sources of the UK constitution. First 
and foremost, as mentioned in relation to HS2, the separation of powers is key in maintaining 
that judges should not be involved in the legislative process. As mentioned, Parliament is 
sovereign in the UK and article 9 of the Bill of Rights prevents the courts from questioning 
what takes place in Parliament. Additionally, the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Guidelines 
are explicit that ‘while dialogue between the judiciary and government may be desirable or 
appropriate, in no circumstances should such dialogue compromise judicial independence.’  
 
Most to the point regarding judicial independence, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 makes 
provision in section 1 about the requirements of the rule of law, while section 3(1) stresses that 
‘The Lord Chancellor, other Ministers of the Crown and all with responsibility for matters 
relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice must uphold the continued 
independence of the judiciary.’ What is also important is the fact that under the Constitutional 
Reform Act, the Lord Chancellor no longer acts as a bridge between the three branches of 
government: presiding officer in the House of Lords, member of the Cabinet and senior judge 
in England and Wales. The Constitutional Reform Act has also established the Supreme Court 
which replaced the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. All these are positive steps 
with regard to judicial independence as required by the doctrine of separation of powers.31 In 
a similar manner to the Constitutional Reform Act, the Judiciary and Courts (Scotland) Act 
2008, established in section 1 similar duties on the First Minister, the Lord Advocate, the 
Scottish Ministers and all persons with responsibility for matters relating to the judiciary and 
the administration of justice.  
 
Certain institutional initiatives are key to securing judicial independence in the UK. They 
include the Judicial Appointments Commission whose Chair and majority of members are not 
judges; the independent Judicial Appointments Board in Scotland; and the Senior Salaries 
Review Body which is a non-political body responsible for making recommendations to the 
Government on the remuneration of the judiciary. Other factors which are relevant to judicial 
independence include judges’ personal immunity from suit for acts and omissions in the 
exercise of their judicial functions. Of course such immunity does not exempt them from the 
general duty to give reasons for their decisions or from complaints. On a similar note, it is 
important to mention that judges of the High Court and the courts above can only be removed 
by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament. 
 
Moving forward, preserving public trust in the judiciary is a challenge ahead for the UK. This 
is important for the preservation of the rule of law which ultimately depends on the faith of the 
 
31 See A. Kavanagh, ‘The constitutional separation of powers’, in D. Dyzanhaus and M. Thorburn (Eds.) 
Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
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public for the institutions that uphold the law. Following recent Brexit litigation, the continuing 
political debate on the role of the judiciary has concerned the extent to which the judiciary is 
guilty of overreaching its constitutional remit, therefore interfering in the executive’s work. As 
Lord Hodge stressed in 2018, ‘there is a danger to judicial independence if elements in the 
media portray a caricature of the judiciary and if judges, politicians and officials with 
responsibility for the administration of justice do not act to correct misunderstandings.’32 This 
refers to the aftermath of the Miller judgment and the Daily Mail’s James Slack’s slogan 
“Enemies of the People” aimed against the three High Court judges who made a rather 
predictable decision by resuscitating the obvious: i.e. that the ‘subordination of the Crown (i.e. 
the executive government) to law is the foundation of the rule of law in the United Kingdom’33 
This backfired a reaction from the lord chief justice, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who criticised 
the then justice secretary, Liz Truss for her failure to defend judges who were branded ‘enemies 
of the people’.   
 
Striking the right balance between freedom of the press and media abuse is going to be crucial 
in future involvement of judges in political controversies – the term ‘judicial overreach’ comes 
to mind – and carries serious repercussions for the constitutional law of foreign affairs since, 
as has been stressed by a commentator, ‘[n]ow that Miller has been handed down, there is 
reason to think that courts will intervene – if appropriate circumstances present themselves – 





Regarding effective judicial protection and access to courts, the focus of the discussion in the 
UK in recent years is placed on the cuts to legal aid and on their effect on those who need to 
rely on legal aid in order to bring a case before a court. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) has limited the circumstances in which civil legal 
aid can be granted. A judgment of the Court of Appeal recently highlighted the impact of the 
EU principle of effective judicial protection on the application and limitations of the legal aid 
cuts. In R (Gudanaviciene), the Court of Appeal held that an exceptional funding determination 
must be made regarding civil legal services if the denial of such funding would breach an 
individual’s rights under the ECHR, and that the contested legal aid rules breached article 47 
of the Charter.35  
 
More generally speaking, it is undeniable that EU law has had an impact on domestic laws and 
procedures. For instance, as a result of the doctrine of state liability, UK citizens can claim 
compensation from public bodies who have breached EU law; this is a possibility that does not 
 
32 Lord Hodge, ‘Preserving judicial independence in an age of populism’, available at 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-181123.pdf> visited 31 January 2020 . 
33 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 
(Admin); [2017] 1 All E.R. 158 at [26]. 
34 A. Hameed, ‘The rule of recognition and sources of law in Miller’ Public Law, Vol.61, 2019, pp.53-73. 
35 R. (on the application of Gudanaviciene) v Director of Legal Aid Casework [2014] EWCA Civ 1622, at [56 -
59]. 
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exist in situations of a legal or administrative wrongdoing where EU law (or the Human Rights 
Act 1998) does not apply.36 EU law has also had a visible impact on domestic rules in the field 
of environmental law.37 For instance, the CJEU has ruled more than once that the UK’s 
litigation costs arrangements breached the Aarhus Convention on access to justice in 
environmental law cases.38 Although in subsequent national litigation, the Supreme Court did 
not clarify the guidance issued by the CJEU that the cost of proceedings must not ‘appear to be 
objectively unreasonable,’39 the caselaw has led to changes to the costs and expenses rules in 
England and Scotland.40  
An area where we might see future developments as to the effect of EU law on national 
procedures and remedies is that of private enforcement of competition law. The EU Damages 
Directive, which was transposed in the UK in 2016, covers certain aspects of private 
enforcement pertaining to damages claims resulting from breach of EU competition rules. 
However, the Directive - and thus the UK Damages Implementation Act41- is not exhaustive, 
leaving several other matters open to be dealt with by UK courts under EU law principles.42 
These issues include inter alia claims for nullity of contracts, restitution, or injunctions, the 
scope of compensation, the availability of class actions, showing fault and the extent of damage 
and proof required.43 Under EU law, when the national judiciary will be called to fill in the 
gaps of the Directive, they should act in accordance with the EU law principles of effectiveness 
and equivalence. It would be interesting, then, to explore and compare the way in which 
domestic rules on private enforcement in the aftermath of the Damages Directive have been 
influenced by the EU legal framework on competition law in general and by the EU general 
principles more broadly speaking. These issues will, of course, depend on the final look of the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU and on the existence or not of a UK-EU deal.44 Still, regardless 
 
36 D. Edwards, ‘Thirty years of judicial review in Scotland: the influence of European Union law’ Jur. Rev., 
Vol.4, 2015, pp.399-416, p.401. 
37 Edwards, 2015, pp. 415-417. 
38 Court of Justice EU 13 February 2014, Case C-530/11, Commission v United Kingdom (2014) 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:6. See also Court of Justice EU 11 April 2013, Case C-260/11, Edwards and Pallikaropoulos 
v Environment Agency (2013) ECLI:EU:C:2013:221. In Venn v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government [2014] EWCA Civ 1539, Sullivan LJ stated that ‘In the light of my conclusion on Article 9(3) , and 
the decisions of the Aarhus Compliance Committee and the CJEU in Commission v UK referred to in paragraph 
24 above, it is now clear that the costs protection regime introduced by CPR 45.41 is not Aarhus compliant 
insofar as it is confined to applications for judicial review, and excludes statutory appeals and applications.’ 
39 Court of Justice EU 11 April 2013, Case C-260/11, Edwards and Pallikaropoulos v Environment Agency 
(2013) ECLI:EU:C:2013:221. The guidance provided by the CJEU on the test of what is ‘prohibitively 
expensive’ has been characterised as cryptic and unable to provide a uniform interpretation throughout the EU. 
See J. Findlay, ‘Protective Expenses Orders - A Settled Regime?’ Scottish Planning & Environmental Law, Vol. 
163, 2014, pp.53-54. For a broader discussion about effective judicial protection see Konstadinides, 2017.   
40 Act of Sederunt (Rules of the Court of Session Amendment) (Protective Expenses Orders in Environmental 
Appeals and Judicial Reviews) 2013 (SSI 2013/81); Cost Protection Rules r.45.41; Venn v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government [2014] EWCA Civ 1539; See Edwards, 2015, pp.415-417. 
41 The Claims in respect of Loss or Damage arising from Competition Infringements (Competition Act 1998 and 
Other Enactments (Amendment)) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/385). 
42 K. Havu and L. Tarkkila, ‘EU Competition litigation and Member State procedural autonomy - current issues’ 
G.C.L.R., Vol.11, No.2, 2018, pp.65-71, p.66. 
43 Havu and Tarkkila, 2018. 
44 See also M. Perraudeau ‘Back to the future: Brexit, EIA and the challenge of environmental judicial review’ 
Env. L. Rev., Vol. 21, No.1, 2019, pp. 6-20, discussing the principle of effectiveness in the context of 
environmental law and the possible impact of Brexit in this field. 
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We should note from the outset that there are no cases (pending or decided) in the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) on the refusal of the UK Supreme 
Court to refer a case to the CJEU. There have been cases where the Supreme Court considered 
whether to refer a matter to the CJEU under article 267 TFEU but refused to do so.45 In a 
number of these cases, the Court concluded that the question was acte clair.46 When these cases 
raised questions of EU law for determination, the Court stated that those questions were either 
not open to reasonable doubt or they involved the application by the national court to the facts 
of established principles of European law.47 Other reasons besides acte clair have also been 
provided by the Court to support its refusal to refer. In one occasion, preliminary reference was 
not sought because it seemed ‘unrealistic to suppose that the Court of Justice would feel able 
to provide any greater or different assistance’ than the Supreme Court.48 This approach has 
been characterised as ‘a striking and significant departure from the criteria contemplated by 
EU law’.49 In another case, Lord Walker advised the Supreme Court that, even if they did not 
perceive the case as acte clair, they should still not refer the case to the CJEU because there 
was ‘a strong public interest in resolving the matter without further delay.’50 
 
The Supreme Court’s refusal to comply with its obligation to refer a matter of EU law to the 
CJEU has attracted criticism with regard to a few key cases, some of which are discussed here.51 
In the case of Re N (Children)52, which concerned Regulation 2201/2003, the Supreme Court 
proceeded on the basis that the issue in question was acte clair even though Lady Hale, who 
gave the judgment of the Court, had explicitly stated that the matter at hand (i.e. whether article 
15 of the Regulation applied to public law proceedings) could not be regarded as acte clair. 
 
45 For a thorough analysis of the Supreme Court’s preliminary references to the CJEU, see A. Arnull, ‘The UK 
Supreme Court and References to the CJEU’ Yearbook of European Law, Vol.36, No.1, 2017, pp.314-357. 
46 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Gubeladze [2019] UKSC 31; R (on the application of Nouazli) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 16; R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of 
State for Justice; McGeoch (AP) v The Lord President of the Council and another (Scotland) [2013] UKSC 63; 
Russell v Transocean International Resources Ltd [2011] UKSC 57; Bowen-West v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government [2012] EWCA Civ 321. 
47 See respectively: X v Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau and another, 12 December 2012, [2012] UKSC 59; 
R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice; McGeoch (AP) v The Lord President of the 
Council and another (Scotland) [2013] UKSC 63. 
48 Morge (FC) v Hampshire County Council [2011] UKSC 2. 
49 V. Heyvaert, J. Thornton, R. Drabble, ‘With reference to the environment: the preliminary reference 
procedure, environmental decisions and the domestic judiciary’ Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 130, 2014, pp. 
413-442, p.426. 
50 The Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc & Others [2009] UKSC 6. 
51 For a discussion of the UK courts and preliminary reference in the field of environmental law, see Heyvaert,  
Thornton, Drabble, 2014. The article argues that domestic courts seem to be particularly reluctant to use the 
preliminary reference procedure when it comes to matters of environmental law. The authors identify three 
reasons for this reluctance: the delay caused to the domestic litigation by sending a case to the ECJ; a concern 
about the quality of the ECJ’s rulings’ and the fact that UK courts appear uncomfortable with the hierarchical 
nature of the preliminary reference procedure.  
52 [2016] UKSC 15 
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The rationale behind refusing to refer the matter in this case was to avoid further delays in the 
litigation that involved children, and it was presented as the best option available to the Court 
at the time. This led to commentary that ‘the option favoured by Lady Hale should have been 
avoided, for it involved a clear breach of the obligation to refer.’53  
 
The refusal of the Court to refer a question in Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National54 has 
also been criticised. The case concerned article 4(2) of Directive 93/13, which had not been 
interpreted by the CJEU up to that point. Various reasons were given for the refusal to refer, 
including that the parties did not want to further delay the litigation process, and that public 
interest mandated a swift resolution of the matter. Yet it is well known that delay in the 
litigation process is not a valid reason for a national court to refuse to refer a matter of EU law 
to the CJEU. As Lord Walker himself noted in the judgment, ‘in other circumstances it might 
be regarded as rather unprincipled to take that means of avoiding an important issue of 
Community law, but in the special circumstances of this case I would regard it as the lesser of 
two evils.’55  
 
In the joint cases R (Chester) and R (McGeogh)56, the Supreme Court dealt with the UK’s 
blanket ban on prisoners’ voting. Questions were raised in the case about whether EU law post-
Lisbon grants a right to vote in European elections and municipal elections to every EU citizen, 
and whether the term ‘municipal elections’ includes elections to the Scottish Parliament. The 
Supreme Court held that the applicants were not entitled to invoke European law because it 
conferred no individual right and the principle of non-discrimination was not engaged. It then 
went on to review the hypothetical question of what would have happened if EU law was 
applied. Although the question was considered in significant length, and despite the connection 
of the matter to EU law, no preliminary reference was made to the CJEU.57 
 
Lastly, the refusal by the Supreme Court to refer is particularly noteworthy in X v Mid-Sussex 
Citizens Advice Bureau58 because the case set a precedent for the UK that volunteers cannot 
rely on the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment and 
occupation59 or the national implementing legislation to challenge alleged discrimination. 
According to Lord Mance, there was no scope for reasonable doubt about this conclusion and 
hence there was no requirement to refer the case to the CJEU. It was noted, however, that ‘it 
can certainly be doubted that it is acte clair that voluntary work is not covered by the 
 
53 Arnull, 2017, p.342. 
54 [2009] UKSC 6 
55 ibid at [50]. 
56 R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice, McGeoch (AP) v The Lord President of the 
Council and another (Scotland) [2013] UKSC 63. 
57 K. Monaghan ‘Case Comment: X v Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau & Anor [2012] UKSC 59’, UK 
Supreme Court Blog, 21 January 2013, <http://ukscblog.com/case-comment-x-v-mid-sussex-citizens-advice-
bureau-anor/> visited 31 January 2020. 
58 X v Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau and another [2012] UKSC 59. 
59 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation. 
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Framework Directive. A more purposive and less literal interpretation of article 3 by the CJEU 
might have led to a different result.’60  
 
It appears from the above examples that a number of reasons is given by the Supreme Court to 
justify its refusal to refer a case to the ECJ, which is not always based on the case being acte 
clair.61 More recently, the preliminary reference procedure was discussed as a possibility in the 
context of cases pertaining to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Academic commentators had 
argued that the Supreme Court was under an obligation to submit a reference in the case of 
R(Miller) with regard to the UK’s constitutional requirements in triggering article 50 TEU.62 
Others argued that determining the revocability of a notice under article 50 TFEU was 
irrelevant to whether the internal, constitutional, requirements for withdrawing from the EU 
have been fulfilled.63 Eventually, the Supreme Court in Miller proceeded on the assumption, 
which was common between the parties, that a notice under article 50 TEU is irrevocable. As 
such, the Court did not even consider the possibility for a preliminary reference. By way of 
contrast, in Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union64 a preliminary 
reference question was sent to the CJEU concerning the revocation by a Member State of the 





60 C. Rauchegger, ‘European Dimensions’, CJICL, Vol. 3, 2014, p.204. 
61 Arnull, 2017. 
62 A. Sanchez-Graells, ‘UK Supreme Court Miller Judgment seeks to reassert Parliamentary Sovereignty but it 
does so in breach of EU law and in disservice to the UK Parliament’, 27 January 2017 
<www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2017/1/24/uk-supreme-court-miller-judgment-seeks-to-reassert-
parliamentary-sovereignty-but-it-does-so-in-breach-of-eu-law-and-in-disservice-to-the-uk-parliament> visited 
31 January 2020; G. Peretz, ‘Will the Supreme Court have to make a reference to the Court of Justice of the EU 
in Miller?: further thoughts’, 14 November 2016 visited 31 January 2020 <www.monckton.com/will-supreme-
court-make-reference-court-justice-eu-miller-thoughts/> . 
63 O. Garner, ‘Referring Brexit to the Court of Justice of the European Union: Why revoking an Article 50 
notice should be left to the United Kingdom’, European Law Blog, 14 November 2016, 
<https://europeanlawblog.eu/2016/11/14/referring-brexit-to-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-why-
revoking-an-article-50-notice-should-be-left-to-the-united-kingdom/> visited 31 January 2020; M. Wienbracke, 
‘The Article 50 Litigation and the Court of Justice: Why the Supreme Court must NOT refer’, Verfassungsblog, 
8 November 2016 <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-article-50-litigation-and-the-court-of-justice-why-the-
supreme-court-must-not-refer/> visited 31 January 2020. 
64 [2018] CSIH 62 
65 Court of Justice EU 10 December 2018, Case C-621/18, Wightman, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, para [44]. 
 
